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The Debris Team has developed and implemented measures to control damage from debris in the
Shuttle operational environment and to make the control measures a part of routine launch flows.
These measures include engineering surveillance during vehicle processing and closeout
operations, facility and flight hardware inspections before and after launch, and photographic
analysis of mission events.
Photographic analyses of mission imagery from launch, on-orbit, and landing provide significant
data in verifying proper operation of systems and evaluating anomalies. In addition to the
Kennedy Space Center Photo/Video Analysis, reports from Johnson Space Center and Marshall
Space Flight Center are also included in this document to provide an integrated assessment of the
mission.
\
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Photo I : Launch of Shuttle Mission STS-66
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1.0 SUMMARY
A pre-launch debris inspection of the pad and Shuttle vehicle was performed on 2 November
1994. The detailed walkdown of Launch Pad 39B and MLP-3 also included the primary flight
elements OV-104 Atlantis (13th flight), ET-67 (LWT 60), and BI-069 SRB's. There were no
vehicle anomalies. Four facility debris items were documented for resolution prior to ET cryoload.
The vehicle was cryoloaded on 3 November 1994. There were no Launch Commit Criteria
(LCC), OMRS, or NSTS-08303 criteria violations. No IPR's were taken. Due to the ambient
weather conditions at this time of year, there were no acreage icing concerns. There were also no
protuberance icing conditions outside of the established data base.
After the 11:59:43 a.m. (local) launch on 3 November 1994, a debris walk down of Pad 39B was
performed. No flight hardware or TPS materials were found. There was no visual indication of a
stud hang-up on any of the south holddown posts. All the T-0 umbilicals operated properly.
Overall, damage to the launch pad was minimal.
A total of 97 films and videos were analyzed as part of the post launch data review. No vehicle
damage or lost flight hardware was observed that would have affected the mission. Dark carbon-
type residue from the GOX seals, which had appeared on the STS-64 and STS-68 ET nosecones,
was not present on the STS-66 ET nosecone after the GOX vent hood was retracted. A black tile
fragment, estimated to be 6 inches by 2 inches by 1 inch thick in size, fell aft near the body flap at
GMT 16:59:40.375. The tile fragment originated at the body flap hinge line area (+Z side) near
the SSME #2 base mounted heat shield and was shaken loose during SSME startup.
On-orbit photography of the External Tank after separation from the Orbiter revealed two TPS
divots on the LO2 tank at or near the LO2 pressurization line ramps. Three stringer head divots
were observed on the intertank acreage: one 14-inch divot just forward of the -Y bipod spindle
housing closeout; one 17-inch by 3.5-inch divot with exposed substrate on the +Z axis forward of
the bipods; and one 24-inch by 3.5-inch divot with exposed substrate on the +Z axis forward of
the bipods. (This type of divot had been the subject of a previous IFA. Manufacturing procedures
at the factory were modified, effective on ET-74, to reduce the potential for TPS damage during
intertank assembly). The lightning contact strip across the forward part of the LO2 ET/ORB
umbilical was missing and observed drifting near the crossbeam.
Video footage of the ET after separation showed venting of residual gases from the ET/ORB
umbilicals. Pieces of frozen hydrogen originated from the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical and drifted
away from the tank. This activity was expected and had been previously documented on the
STS-45, STS-53, and STS-68 missions.
Video taken from the RMS wrist camera showed liquid expelled from the supply water dump
nozzle on the port side of the Orbiter near the crew hatch. The video also revealed the water had
frozen, adhered to the port payload bay door, and formed an icicle estimated to be at least 4 feet
in length. This condition was the subject of an IFA. No camera coverage of payload bay door
closing was available to determine the amount of ice still attached to the outer surface of the door.
Some of this ice, which broke off and fell aft during re-entry, is believed to be the cause of tile
damage on the RH OMS pod leading edge and the vertical stabilizer. Post landing inspections and
film review showed ice still adhering to the left payload bay door after rollout and wheel stop.
The Solid RocketBoosterswere inspectedat HangerAF after retrieval.The RH frustum was
missingno TPS but had 50 debonds over fasteners and 2 debonds over acreage. The LH frustum
was missing no TPS but had 39 MSA-2 debonds over fasteners. Since the number of debonds was
greater than the frustum history average of 25 debonds per frustum, a representative set of the
MSA-2 debonds were analyzed by MSFC under an IFA for possible material or processing
anomalies. The problem was traced to an MSA-2 spray pump problem. Otherwise, both recovered
SRB's were in good condition from a debris standpoint.
Orbiterperformance as viewed on landing films and videos during final approach, touchdown, and
rollout was nominal. Drag chute operation was also normal.
A post landing inspection of OV-104 Atlantis was conducted on the runway at Dryden Hight
Research Center/Edwards AFB. The Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 148 hits, of which 28 had a
major dimension of 1-inch or larger. Based on these numbers and comparison to statistics from
previous missions of similar configuration, both the total number of hits and the number of hits
1-inch or larger were slightly greater than average. The Orbiter lower surface sustained a total of
111 hits, of which 22 had a major dimension of 1-inch or larger. The two largest damage sites on
the lower surface were located forward of the LO2 ET/ORB umbilical and measured 7.375 inches
by 3.75 inches by 0.5 inches and 5.25 inches by 1.25 inches by 0.25 inches.
The supply water dump ice deposit on the forward section of the left payload bay door, as
observed in the on-orbit video downlink, was still attached after landing and measured
approximately 8 inches by 4 inches by 2 inches. The largest tile damage sites on the orbiter were
located on the top of the RH OMS pod forward facing surface measuring 8 inches by 5 inches by
2 inches and on the leading edge of the right rudder/speed brake panel measuring 12 inches by 4
inches by 2 inches. The damage to these two areas was most likely caused by impacts from supply
water dump ice falling aft from the payload bay dOor.
A 2 inch by 1 inch by 1 inch thick portion of an aft perimeter tile on window #8 was missing and
was the subject of an IFA because of a similar occurrence on the previous mission, STS-68.
This was the first use of a refurbished drag chute. All drag chute hardware was recovered and
showed no signs of abnormal operation.
Orbiter post landing microchemical sample results revealed a variety of residuals in the Orbiter
window samples from the window protective covers, facility environment, SRB BSM exhaust,
Orbiter TPS, RCS thruster paper covers, and paints/primers from various sources. A late sample
taken from OV-105 windows after the STS-68 mission provided material that has been identified
as RCS nozzle paper cover. The paper visually compared to the red and white checkered 'butcher
paper' used on forward RCS nozzles to prevent moisture intrusion. Motion picture cameras
previously mounted in the pilot's window on some of the launches early in the program had
documented FRCS paper cover impacts on the forward facing windows during ascent. This
sampling data further confirms the presence/contact of paper cover material on the windows.
These residual sampling data do not indicate a single source of damaging debris as all of the other
materials have previously been documented in post-landing sample reports. The residual sample
data showed no debris trends when compared to previous mission data.
A total of twelve Post Launch Anomalies, including three In-Flight Anomalies (IFA's), were
observed during the STS-66 mission assessment.
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2.0 PRE-LAUNCH BRIEFING
The Debrisflce/TPS and Photographic Analysis Team briefing for launch activities was conducted
on 2 November 1994 at 1130 hours. The following personnel participated in various team
activities, assisted in the collection and evaluation of data, and contributed to reports contained in
this document.
J. Tatum NASA - KSC
G. Katnik NASA - KSC
B. Davis NASA - KSC
R. Speece NASA - KSC
B. Bowen NASA - KSC
K. Tenbusch NASA - KSC
J. Rivera NASA - KSC
M. Bassignani NASA - KSC
J. Blue LSOC - SPC
G. Fales LSOC - SPC
M. Jaime LSOC - SPC
S. Clarke Rockwell LSS
J. Cook MTI - LSS
S. Otto
K. Ely
D. Maxwell
Chief, ET/SRB Mechanical Systems
Shuttle Ice/Debris Systems
Digital Imaging Systems
Lead, Thermal Protection Systems
Infrared Scanning Systems
ET Thermal Protection Systems
Lead, ET Mechanisms/Structures
ET Mechanisms, Structures
ET Mechanical Systems
ET Mechanical Systems
Lead, ET Mechanical Systems
Systems Integration
SRM Processing
MMMSS- LSS ET Processing
MMMSS- LSS ET Processing
LSOC - SPC Safety
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3.0 LAUNCH :
STS-66 was launched at 94:307:16:59:43.004 GMT (11:59:43 a.m. local) on 3 November 1994.
3.1 PRE-LAUNCH SSV/PAD DEBRIS INSPECTION
A pre-launch debris inspection of the launch pad and Shuttle vehicle was performed on
November 2, 1994, from 1230 to 1400 hours. The detailed walkdown of Pad 39B and MLP-3
also included the primary flight elements OV-104 Atlantis (13th flight), ET-67 (LWT 60), and
BI-069 SRB's. There were no vehicle anomalies.
Four facility debris items were entered in Appendix K for resolution prior to ET cryoload: 1)
construction debris around substation 1032 east of the pad slope; 2) rusted/loose electric outlet,
brackets, and conduit on the east pad apron; 3) rusted/loose distribution box on the east apron;
and 4) a considerable amount of rust/metal flakes near the loose distribution box. All of these
discrepancies were not a debris threat to the vehicle for launch, but could have damaged other pad
systems, such as the nearby liquid hydrogen sphere. No specific group has been tasked with
responsibility for foreign object debris issues in the areas from the pad slope to the perimeter
fence. Pad site managers will meet to resolve this concern.
3.2 FINAL INSPECTION
The Final Inspection of the cryoloaded vehicle was performed on 3 November 1994 from 0800 to
0915 hours during the t_vo hour built-in-hold at T-3 hours in the countdown. There were no
Launch Commit Criteria (LCC), OMRS, or NSTS-08303 criteria violations. No IPR's were
taken. Due to the ambient weather conditions at this time of year, there were no acreage icing
concerns. There were also no protuberance icing conditions outside of the established data base.
Ambient weather conditions at the time of the inspection were:
T-3 Hours T-0 Launch
Wind Speed (knots):
Wind Direction (degrees):
Relative Humidity (.percent):
Temperature (degrees F):
Dew Point (degrees F):
11 O9
068 069
67 65
74 76
63 64
A portable Shuttle Thermal Imager (STI) infrared scanning radiometer was utilized to scan the
vehicle for unusual temperature gradients, particularly those areas not visible from remote fixed
scanners, and to obtain a random sampling of vehicle surface temperature measurements to
thermally characterize the vehicle.
3.3 ORBITER
No Orbiter tile or RCC panel anomalies were observed. All RCS thruster paper covers were intact
and dry. Less than usual ice/frost accumulations were present at the SSME #1 and #2 heat shield-
to-nozzle interfaces. An infrared scan revealed no unusual temperature gradients on the base heat
shield or engine mounted heat shields.
k.
3.4 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS
SRB case temperatures measured by the fixed STI radiometers ranged from 72-75 degrees F. In
comparison, temperatures measured by the SRB Ground Environment Instrumentation (GEl)
ranged from 72-77 degrees F. All measured temperatures were above the 34 degrees F minirmLrn
requirement. The predicted Propellant Mean Bulk Temperature (PMBT) supplied by MTI was 76
degrees F, which was within the required range of 44-86 degrees F.
J
3.5 EXTERNAL TANK
The ice/frost prediction computer program 'SURFICE' was run as a general comparison to
infrared scanner point measurements. The program predicted condensate with no ice/frost
accumulation on the TPS acreage surfaces during cryoload.
The Final Inspection Team observed light condensate, but no ice or frost accumulations, on the
LO2 tank. There were no TPS anomalies.
The intertank acreage exhibited no TPS anomalies. Typical ice/frost accumulation, but no unusual
vapor, was present on the ET umbilical carder plate.
There were no LH2 tank TPS acreage anomalies. Light condensate, but no ice or frost
accumulations, were present on the acreage.
There were no anomalies on the bipod jack pad closeouts. A crack, 4 inches long by 3/8-inch
wide, was present in the -Y ET/SRB cable tray forward surface TPS. The presence of the crack
was acceptable for flight per the NSTS-08303 criteria.
Less than usual amounts of ice frost had accumulated in the LO2 feedline bellows and support
brackets.
There were no TPS anomalies on the LO2 ET/ORB umbilical. Some ice and frost had formed at
the LO2 feedline-to-umbilical interface 6 o'clock pos{tion. Ice/frost fingers on the separation bolt
pyrotechnic canister purge vents were typical.
Ice and frost in the LH2 recirculation line bellows and on both burst disks was typical. The LH2
feedline bellows were covered by some ice/frost and condensate.
Less than usual amounts of ice/frost had accumulated on the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical purge
barrier top and outboard sides. Typical ice/frost fingers were present on the pyro canister and
plate gap purge vents. Ice/frost had formed at the forward comer of the 17-inch flapper valve
actuator access port foam plug. Ice/frost had also formed on the forward outboard and aft pyro
canister closeout bondlines. No unusual vapors or cryogenic drips had appeared during tanking,
stable replenish, and launch.
The summary of Ice/Frost Team observations/anomalies, which were all acceptable for launch per
the NSTS-08303 criteria, consisted of three OTV recorded items:
Anomaly 001 documented an 4-inch by 3/8-inch crack in the forward surface TPS of the -Y
vertical strut/ET-SRB cane tray.
Anomaly 002 documented ice/frost formations in the LO2 feedline support brackets and bellows.
6
Anomaly003documentedice/frostformationson theLO2 ET/ORBumbilicalpurgeventsan_d the
LH2 ET/ORB umbilical purge vents, recirculation line bellows, purge barrier, and forward
outboard pyro canister closeout bondline.
3.6 FACILITY
All SRB sound suppression water troughs were Fdled and properly configured for launch (LCC
requirement).
No leaks were observed on either the LO2 or LH2 Orbiter T-0 umbilicals, the GH2 vent line, or
the Ground Umbilical Carrier Plate (GUCP).
No damage to the ET nosecone/footprint area was visible after the GOX vent hood was retracted.
No dark spots or residue from the GOX seals were observed in the nosecone footprint area.
7
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Photo 2 : Overall View of STS-66 Vehicle
OV-104 Atlantis (13th flight), ET-67 (LWT 60), and BI-069 SRB's
No ice or TPS anomalies on thc Extcrnal Tank acrcagc
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Photo 3 : Overall View of Main Engines
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JPhoto 4 : ET/ORB LH2 Umbilical
Less than usual ice/frost had formcd on the umbilical during cryoload
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4.0 POST LAUNCH PAD DEBRIS INSPECTION
The post launch inspection of the MLP, FSS and RSS was conducted on 3 November 1994 from
2.5 to 4 hours after launch.
No flight hardware or TPS materials were found. Facility debris found on the MLP deck included
a one foot square piece of blue tarp, one metal part tag, and a chain hook.
South SRB HDP erosion was typical. All south HDP shoe EPON shim material was intact though
numerous voids and pitting were observed in the sidewall shim material. There was no visual
indication of a stud hang-up on any of the south holddown posts. All of the north HDP doghouse
blast covers were in the closed position. Erosion of the blast covers was typical. Most of the
erosion had occurred on the HDP #7 and #8 covers. A crack was visible in the southwest comer
of the HDP #4 cover. The SRB aft skirt purge lines and T-0 umbilicals exhibited typical exhaust
plume damage.
The Tail Service Masts (TSM), Orbiter Access Arm (OAA), and GOX vent arm appeared
undamaged.
The GH2 vent line was latched on the 8th tooth of the latching mechanism, had no loose cables
(static retract lanyard), and appeared to have latched properly with no rebound. However, minor
damage to the GUCP cross brace may have been caused by contact with the static retract lanyard.
Although the vent line came to rest centered in the haunch, paint damage on the north ratchet may
be indicative of contact with the north side support during retraction.
Minor, but typical, pad damage included:
Four broken stadium lights
Numerous open and damaged access doors and cable tray covers
FSS "215" and "255" foot level signs on the FSS grating
4-foot by 5-foot Herculite cover on the FSS 195 foot level grating
Broken walkway lamp on the RSS 215 foot level
Walkdowns of the pad apron, flame trenches, and pad acreage were performed. No flight
hardware or TPS material was found.
Post launch pad inspection anomalies are listed in Section 9.
11
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Photo 5 : North Holddown Post Blast Cover Erosion
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5.0 FILM REVIEW
Anomalies observed in the Film Review were presented to the Mission Management Team,
Shuttle managers, and vehicle systems engineers. No IPR's or IFA's were generated as a result of
the fill review. Post flight anomalies _e listed in Section 9.
5.1 LAUNCH FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY
A total of 97 films and videos, which included thirty-seven 16mm fills, twenty 35mm fills, three
70mm fills, and thirty-seven videos, were reviewed starting on launch day.
No vehicle damage or lost flight hardware was observed that would have affected the mission.
Black residue from the GOX seals, which had appeared on the STS-64 and STS-68 ET
nosecones, was not present on the STS-66 ET nosecone after the GOX vent hood was retracted
(OTV 113, 160, 162). Lab analysis had shown the residue consisted of carbon and teflon with
traces of rust. Compressor seals at Air Liquide Company were the most likely origin of the
residue.
Several dark objects, believed to be silhouetted water drops from the facility deluge, fell close to
the camera lens during ignition and liftoff (E-30).
SSME ignition, Mach diamond formation, and gimbal profile appeared normal (OTV 151, 170,
171). Three streaks occurred in the SSME #1 plume during startup (E-2, -3).
SSME ignition caused numerous pieces of ice to fall from the ET/Orbiter umbilicals. Some pieces
of ice contacted the umbilical cavity sill and were deflected outward, but no tile damage was
visible (OTV 109, 163, 164, E-34).
A black tile fragment, estimated to be 6 inches by 2 inches by 1 inch thick in size, fell aft near the
body flap at GMT 16:59:40.375 (E-5, -18, -19). The tile fragment originated at the body flap
hinge line area (+Z side) near the SSME #2 base mounted heat shield (E-77, frame 372). The tile
fragment was shaken loose during SSME startup prior to Mach diamond formation This fragment
is also visible in film item E-52 at 16:59:40.127 GMT falling between the SSME #2 nozzle and
the body flap.
A small piece of tile surface coating material was lost from the base heat shield near SSME #2 (E-
18).
Fore-and-aft movement of the Orbiter base heat shield in the centerline area between the SSME
cluster occurred during engine start-up. The motion was similar to that observed on previous
launches (E-76, -77).
Dust from the upper surface of the right wing fell aft of the elevons during SSME ignition (E-6).
The External Tank "twanged" approximately 32 inches during SSME ignition (E-79).
SRB ignition occurred at 16:59:43.013 GMT.
No stud hang-ups occurred on any of the holddown posts. No ordnance fragments or frangible
nut pieces fell from any of the DCS/stud holes. A small, dark object, most likely a piece of hold
down post shoe shim material, fell from the HDP #7 shoe into the SRB exhaust hole (E-11). All
north holddown posts doghouse blast covers closed normally.
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A clothpartstag from the SRB sound suppression water troughs was ejected upward between the
Orbiter and SRB's after T-0 (E-5). A second cloth parts tag was visible near HDP #7 ('E-14, -16).
The Orbiter LH2 and LO2 T-0 umbilicals disconnected and retracted properly (OTV 149, 150;
E-17,-18).
GUCP disconnect from the External Tank was nominal (OTV 104, 160, 167). GH2 vent line
retraction was normal. However, excessive slack in the static retract lanyard caused contact with
the GUCP 7-inch line quick disconnect (E-41, 42).
White objects at the edge of the SRB exhaust cloud are believed to be pieces of ice from the pad
cross country cryogenic lines (E-60).
Large pieces of SRB throat plug moved north and upward out of the SRB flame trench soon after
liftoff (E-62).
Pieces of ET/ORB umbilical ice continued to fall during early ascent (E-62).
A cluster of particles, most likely pieces of FRCS thruster paper covers, were visible falling aft
along the right side of the Orbiter at 17:00:05.198 GMT (E-59).
Numerous small SRB propellant particles fell aft near the SRB plumes during ascent (E-220,
-223, -224; E-59: two at 17:00:11.642, two more at 17:00:14.308). More particles were observed
near the SRB exhaust plumes between 65 and 82 seconds MET.
A piece of ET/ORB umbilical purge barrier material fell aft during the roll maneuver (E-207,
frame 1706). Two more pieces appeared aft of the body flap (E-207, frame 3027). Later in flight,
another piece entered the SSME plume and caused a flash (E-222, 17:00:30.016 GMT).
Three more flashes, typically caused by debris from purge barrier material or RCS thruster paper
covers, occurred in the SSME plume during ascent (E-222).
Body flap movement (amplitude and frequency) was similar to previous flights (E-207, -212,
-213).
Programmed movement of the elevons for load relief during ascent was visible (E-207, -212).
ET aft dome charring, though occurring early in the flight, was typical. SRB plume tailoff and
separation appeared normal. Numerous pieces of slag dropped out of the SRB plume before,
during, and after separation (E-207, -208, -212, -220).
14
JPhoto 6 : Loss of Tile Fragment from Body Flap Hinge
The black tile fragment, visible against the SSME #2 white DMlqS closeout blanket and dark bell
nozzle (arrows), was shaken loose during SSME ignition at approximately T-2.6 seconds MET
15
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Photo 7 : Flash in SSME Plume Caused by Debris
Typical sequence shows debris, such as ET/ORB umbilical purge barrier material or RCS
thruster paper cover, failing into SSME exhaust plume and causing an orange flash (arrows)
16
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J5.2 ON-ORBIT FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY
DTO-0312 was performed by the flight crew. Twenty-two hand-held 35mm still images and some
video were obtained of the External Tank after separation from the Orbiter.
OV-104 was equipped to carry umbilical cameras: 16ram motion picture with 5 mm lens; 16ram
motion picture with 10mm lens; 35mm still views. Data was obtained from all sources.
No vehicle damage or lost flight hardware was observed that would have been a safety of flight
concern.
Solid Rocket Booster separation from the External Tank was nominal.
Vapors in the vicinity of the LH SRB aft booster factory joints and ETA ring were identified as
exhaust plume recirculation vapors backlit by the sun.
External Tank separation from the Orbiter was nominal.
The BSM bum scars on the LO2 tank were typical. No anomalies were observed on the
nosecone, PAL ramps, RSS antennae, flight door, LO2 feed line, and aft hard point. Erosion of
the manhole cover closeouts and aft dome apex was also typical.
Two TPS divots were observed on the LO2 tank at or near the LO2 pressurization line ramps:
one 4-inch divot at approximately XT-514; one 9-inch divot at approximately XT-676.
Three stringer head divots were observed on the intertank acreage: one 14-inch divot just forward
of the -Y bipod spindle housing closeout; one 17-inch by 3.5-inch divot with exposed substrate on
the +Z axis forward of the bipods; and one 24-inch by 3.5-inch divot with exposed substrate on
the +Z axis forward of the bipods. (This type of divot had been the subject of a previous IFA.
Manufacturing procedures at the factory were modified, effective on ET-74, to reduce the
potential for TPS damage during intertank assembly).
Four divots were present in the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout: one 5-inch divot in the
-Y+Z quadrant; one 7-inch divot adjacent to the -Y bipod spindle housing closeout; and two
5-inch divots to the +Y side of the PAL ramp.
Both bipod jack pad closeouts were intact and appeared to be in excellent condition.
The LH2 tank acreage was generally in good condition with the exception of one shallow divot
aft of the bipods and numerous shallow "popcorn" type divots forward of the crossbeam in the
lower third area of the barrel section.
LO2 feedline and +Y thrust strut flange closeouts exhibited minor erosion, lee was still present in
the LO2 feedline lower bellows.
The LH2 ET/ORB umbilical appeared to be in good condition with little or no TPS damage. The
red purge seal was intact. Blistering of the fire barrier coating was typical. Frozen hydrogen
adhered to the 17-inch flapper valve. Foam was missing or eroded from the horizontal (clamshell)
section of the cable tray and the aft surface of the -Y vertical strut.
17
The LO2 ET/ORB umbilical sustained little or no TPS damage. Numerous divots and eroded
areas were visible on the horizontal and vertical sections of the cable tray. The red purge seal was
intact. The lightning contact strip across the forward part of the umbilical was missing and
observed drifting near the umbilical area.
Video footage of the ET after separation showed venting of residual gases from the ET/ORB
umbilicals. Pieces of frozen hydrogen originated from the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical and drifted
away from the tank. This activity was expected and had been previously documented on the
STS-45, STS-53, and STS-68 missions.
Video taken from the RMS wrist camera showed liquid expelled from the supply water dump
nozzle on the port side of the Orbiter near the crew hatch. The video also revealed the water had
frozen, adhered to the port payload bay door, and formed an icicle estimated to be at least 4 feet
in length. No camera coverage of payload bay door closing was available to determine the amount
of ice still attached to the outer surface of the door. Some of this ice, which broke off and fell aft
during re-entry, is believed to be the cause of tile damage on the RH OMS p.od leading edge and
the vertical stabilizer. Post landing inspections and film review showed ice still adhering to the left
payload bay door after rollout and wheel stop.
?
K.
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JPhoto 8 : Nominal SRB Separation from External Tank
Charring and erosion of the TPS on the aft surfaces of the ET/ORB LH2 umbilical cable tray and
-Y vertical strut was typical. The sun's position behind the left SRB caused the bright spots on the
SRB ETA ring and External Tank aft dome insulation (arrows).
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JPhoto 9 : Nominal ET Separation from Orbiter
The LH2 ET/ORB umbilical appeared to be in good condition with little or no TPS damage.
Blistering of the fire barrier on the outboard side of the umbilical was typical. Frozen hydrogen
adhered to the 17-inch flapper valve.
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Photo 10 : View of LO2 ET/ORB Umbilical and Feedline
The LO2 umbilical sustained little TPS damage. Foam was missing from the cable tray. The
lightning contact strip across the forward part of the umbilical was missing. Note shallow divots
on the LH2 tank TPS acreage; erosion on the LO2 fcedline and thrust strut flange closeouts.
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Photo 11 : Free Floating Lightning Contact Strip
The lightning contact strip, dctachcd from thc forward part of the LO2 ET/ORB umbilical,
reflected sunlight whflc drifting away from the umbilical area.
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JPhoto 12 : View of Jack Pad Cioseouts and +Z Acreage
One 9-inch divot was visible on the LO2 tank at or near the LO2 pressurization line ramp (arrow
#1). Three stringer head divots occurred on the intertank acreage: one 14-inch divot just forward
of the -Y bipod spindle housing closcout (#2); one 17-inch by 3.5-inch divot with exposed
substrate on the +Z axis forward of the bipods (#3); and one 24-inch by 3.5-inch divot with
exposed substrate on the +Z axis forward of the bipods (#4). Four divots were present in the LH2
tank-to-intertank flange closeout (#5). Both bipod jack pad closeouts were intact and appeared to
be in excellent condition.
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F Photo 13 : Pre-Launch View of ET lntertank/Bipods
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JPhoto 14 : Icicle Formation on Payload Bay Door
The RMS wrist camera showed liquid expelled from the supply water dump nozzle (upper left
photo) on the port sidc of the Orbiter near the crew hatch. The video also revealed the water had
frozen, adhered to the port payload bay door (upper right photo), and formed an icicle estimated
to be at least 4 feet in length (lower left and lower fight photos).
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5.3 LANDING FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY
Eight 16ram films, two 35mm large format films, and four videos of landing were reviewed.
Orbiter performance on final approach appeared normal. There were no anomalies when the
landing gear was extended. Touchdown of the left and right main gear was nominal and virtually
simultaneous.
The drag chute was deployed after breakover, but before the nose gear contacted the runway.
Drag chute deployment appeared nominal. Two pieces of black material, which are made of
Teflon cloth and used in packing of the chute to prevent abrasion, came loose during chute
deployment and fell to the runway.
Touchdown of the nose landing gear was smooth.
Rollout and wheel stop were uneventful. No large tile damage sites were visible on the Orbiter
lower surface. However, two damage sites were observed on the RH OMS pod leading edge tiles.
Ice still adhered to the left payload bay door #1 panel. This ice was the remnant of the 4-foot
icicle formed on-orbit by the supply water dump.
P
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6.0 SRB POST FLIGHT/RETRIEVAL DEBRIS ASSESSMENT
Both Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected for debris damage and debris sources at CCAFS
Hangar AF on 7 November 1994. From a debris standpoint, both SRB's were in good condition.
6.1 RE[ SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER DEBRIS INSPECTION
The RH frustum was missing no TPS but had 50 debonds over fasteners and 2 debonds over
acreage (Figure 1). Since the number of debonds was greater than the frustum history average of
25 debonds, a representative set of the MSA-2 debonds were analyzed by MSFC for possible
material or processing anomalies (IFA: MSA-2 did not adhere to painted surfaces adjacent to PR
1422-sealant-over-fastener debonds. The problem was traced to an MSA-2 spray pump problem).
Hypalon paint was blistered/missing where BTA closeouts had been applied. Some of the
underlying BTA was sooted. The BSM aero heat shield covers had locked in the fully opened
position.
The RH forward assembly was missing no TPS but had one debond near the +Z RSS antenna
between the 492 and 523 ring frames. Both RSS antennae covers/phenolic base plates were intact.
Hypalon paint was blistered/missing over the areas where BTA had been applied. No pins were
missing from the frustum severance ring.
The Field Joint Protection System (FJPS) closeouts were generally in good condition. A 2-inch
debond occurred in the forward factory joint 145 degree location. Trailing edge damage to the
FJPS and the GEl cork runs were attributed to debris resulting from severance of the nozzle
extension.
Separation of the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. The ET/SRB aft struts, ETA ring, lEA, and
IEA covers appeared undamaged. The aft booster stiffener ring splice plate closeouts were intact
and no K5NA material was missing.
The phenolic material on the kick ring exhibited minor delamination. Aft skirt acreage TPS was
generally in good condition. One MSA-2 debond occurred near the -Y axis at the XB-1860 ring
frame. A 2-inch diameter MSA-2 divot was present near the -Y axis at the XB-1894 ring frame
(Figure 2). Hypalon paint was blistered/missing over the areas where BTA had been applied. The
HDP Debris Containment System (DCS) plungers were seated and appeared to have functioned
properly.
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Figure 1 : RH SRB Frustum
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Figure2 : RH SRB Aft Skirt
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Photo 15 : RH Frustum
The RH frustum was missing no TPS but had 50 MSA-2 debonds over fasteners and 2 debonds
over acreage. The BSM aero heat shield covers had locked in the fully opened position.
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J Photo 16 : RH Forward Assembly
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Photo 17 : RH Aft Booster/Aft Skirt
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t6.2 LH SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER DEBRIS INSPECTION
The LH frustum was missing no TPS but had 39 MSA-2 debonds over fasteners (Figure 3). Since
the number of debonds was greater than the frustum history average of 25 debonds, a
representative set of the MSA-2 debonds were analyzed by MSFC for possible material or
processing anomalies (IFA: MSA-2 did not adhere to painted surfaces adjacent to PR 1422-
sealant-over-fastener debonds. The problem was traced to an MSA-2 spray pump problem).
Hypalon paint was blistered/missing where BTA had been applied. Some of the underlying BTA
was sooted. The BSM aero heat shield covers had locked in the fully opened position.
The LH forward assembly acreage exhibited no debonds or missing TPS. Both RSS antennae
covers/phenolic base plates were intact. Blistering of the Hypalon paint occurred near the
ET/SRB attach point where BTA bad been applied. No pins were missing from the frustum
severance ring.
The Field Joint Protection System (FJPS) closeouts were in good condition. In general, minor
trailing edge damage to the FJPS and the GEl cork runs were attributed to debris resulting from
severance of the nozzle extension.
Separation of the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. The ET/SRB aft struts, ETA ring, IEA, and
lEA covers appeared undamaged. One stiffener ring was damaged by water impact. The stiffener
ring splice plate closeouts were intact and no K5NA material was missing.
Three layers of phenolic material had delaminated on the kick ring - a typical occurrence. APt skirt
acreage TPS was generally in good condition. Hypalon paint was blistered over areas where BTA
had been applied. The HDP Debris Containment System (DCS) plungers were seated and
appeared to have functioned properly.
SRB Post Launch Anomalies are listed in Section 9.
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Figure 3 : LH SRB Frustum
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Photo 18 : LH Frustum
The LH frustum was missing no TPS but had 39 MSA-2 dcbonds over fasteners. Hypalon paint
was blistcrcd/missing whcrc BTA closeouts had bccn applied. All BSM aero heat shicld covcrs
had locked in the fully opcncd position.
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4- Photo 19 : LH Forward Assembly
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Photo 20 : LH Aft Booster/Aft Skirt
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7.0 ORBITER POST LANDING DEBRIS ASSESSMENT
A post landing debris inspection of OV-104 (Atlantis) was conducted 14-16 November 1994 at
the Dryden Flight Research Center/Edwards Air Force Base on runway 22 and in the
Mate/Demate Device. This inspection was performed to identify debris impact damage and, if
possible, debris sources. The Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 148 hits, of which 28 had a major
dimension of 1-inch or larger. This total does not include the numerous hits on the base heat
shield attributed to SSME vibration/acoustics and exhaust plume recirculation. A comparison of
these numbers to statistics from 50 previous missions of similar configuration (excluding missions
STS-23, 25, 26, 26R, 27R, 30R, and 42, which had damage from known debris sources),
indicates both the total number of hits and the number of hits 1-inch or larger were slightly greater
than average (reference Figures 4-7).
The following table breaks down the STS-66 Orbiter debris damage by area:
HITS > 1" TOTAL HITS
Lower surface 22 111
Upper surface 2 29
Right side 1 2
Left side 0 0
Right OMS Pod 1 1
Left OMS Pod 2 5
TOTALS 28 148
The Orbiter lower surface sustained a total of 111 hits, of which 22 had a major dimension of
1-inch or larger. The two largest damage sites on the lower surface were located forward of the
LO2 ET/ORB umbilical and measured 7.375 inches by 3.75 inches by 0.5 inches and 5.25 inches
by 1.25 inches by 0.25 inches. Slumping occurred on two lower surface tiles at the left inboard
elevon leading edge near the center hinge location (tiles 193023-033 and -035).
The supply water dump ice deposit on the forward section of the left payload bay door, as
observed in the on-orbit video downlink, was still attached after landing and measured
approximately 8 inches by 4 inches by 2 inches (IFA STS-66-V-10/IPR 71V-0013: Ice on Supply
Water Dump). Shedding ice from this area during reentry is believed to be the cause of the tile
damage on the right OMS pod and rudder/speed brake panel. On-orbit photographs taken by the
flight crew two days prior to reentry verified no damage was present at that time.
The largest tile damage sites on the orbiter were located on the top of the RH OMS pod forward
facing surface measuring 8 inches by 5 inches by 2 inches and on the leading edge of the right
rudder/speed brake panel measuring 12 inches by 4 inches by 2 inches. The damage was most
likely caused by impacts from supply water dump ice formed while in orbit.
A piece of AFRSI on the leading edge perimeter of side access fuselage door 45 was detached.
No tile damage from micrometeorites or on-orbit debris was identified during the inspection.
No TPS damage was attributed to material from the wheels, tires, or brakes. The tires were in
excellent condition after the landing.
38
ET/OrbiterseparationdevicesEO-1,EO-2,andEO-3functionedproperlyandthedebrisplungers
were seated.All ET/Orbiter umbilical separation ordnance retention shutters were closed
properly. This was the first flight of the "shuttered" debris retention system. The previously used
"plungers" had been replaced during arecent modification. No significant amounts of foam or red
purge seal adhered to the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical near the 4-inch flapper valve. No debris was
found on the runway beneath the ET/ORB umbilical cavities.
Orbiter windows #3 and #4 exhibited light hazing and streaks. A total of 17 hits were observed on
the perimeter tiles of windows #2, 3, 4, and 5 with the largest damage site measuring 1.5 inches
by 1 inch by 1 inch at window #2. Tile hits in this area and window streaking have been attributed
in the past to impacts from FRCS paper covers and/or paper cover RTV.
A 2 inch by 1 inch by 1 inch thick portion of an aft perimeter tile on window #8 was missing (IFA
STS-66-V- 15).
The number of tile damage sites on the base heat shield was normal with the majority of the hits
occurring near the center of the heat shield. The Dome Mounted Heat Shield (DMHS) closeout
blankets on all three SSME's were in good condition with SSME #1 exhibiting a torn blanket
from 4 to 6 o'clock position and fraying at the 12 o'clock position. The aft quarter of a body flap
stub tile (395018-163 $83055) was missing from the +Z side of the body flap below and outboard
of SSME #2 and was the black tile fragment observed during launch film reviews. Tiles on the
vertical stabilizer "stinger" and around the drag chute door were intact and undamaged
This was the fu'st use of a refurbished drag chute. All drag chute hardware was recovered and
showed no signs of abnormal operation. Two 6 inch by 6 inch pieces of black Teflon fabric used
in the packing of the chute to prevent abrasions were also recovered on the runway.
Runway 22 had been swept/inspected by Air Force personnel prior to landing and all potentially
damaging debris was removed. A post landing walkdown of the runway was performed
immediately after landing. No Shuttle flight hardware was found on the runway.
In summary, both the total number of Orbiter TPS debris hits and the number of hits 1-inch or
larger was slightly greater than average when compaJ'ed to previous missions (Figures 8-9). The
type of TPS damage was typical and not attributable to any single debris source.
Orbiter Post Launch Debris Anomalies are listed in Section 9.
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Figure 4 : Orbiter Lower Surface Debris Map
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Figure 5 : Orbiter Right Side Debris Map
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Figure 6 : Orbiter Left Side Debris Map
42
CHARRED PIECE OF
UMBILICAL BAGGIE WEDGED
IN THERMAL BARRIER
8.0xS.0X2.0
LOST AFT 1/4 OF BODY FLAP
TRAILING EDGE STUB TILE ON
UPPER SURFACE
(TILE V070-395018-163)
583055
2.0x1.0x0.25
TOTAL HITS = 30
HITS >_1 INCH = 4
2.0x1.0x1.0
5 HITS
2 HITS
NOTE: ALL DIMENSIONS IN
INCHES
Q
8 HITS WITH 1 > 1 INCH
(1.5 x 1.0 x 1.0)
2 HITS
1.0 x 1.0 x 0.5
(STAR TRACKER PERIMETER TILE)
Figure 7 : Orbiter Upper Surface Debris Map
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MISSIONS STS-23, 24, 25, 26, 26R, 27R, 3OR, AND 42 ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THIS ANALYSIS
SINCE THESE MISSIONS HAD SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE CAUSED BY KNOWN DEBRIS SOURCE
Figure 8 : Orbiter Post Flight Debris Damage Summary
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Figure 9 : Orbiter Debris Damage Comparison Chart
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J Photo 21 : Overall View of Orbiter Right Side
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United States
Photo 22 : Overall View of Orbiter Left Side
Note ice still attached to left payload bay door (arrow)
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Photo 23 : Overall View of Orbiter Nose/Windows
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fPhoto 24 : Lower Surface Tile Damage
The Orbiter lower surface sustained a total of 111 hits, of which 22 had a major dimension
of 1-inch or larger. This view includes the lower right sidc/chinc area.
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Photo 25 : Lower Surface Tile Damage
The two largcst damagc sites on the lower surface wcrc located forward of thc LO2 ET/ORB
umbilical and measured 7.375 inches by 3.75 inches by 0.5 inches and 5.25 inches by 1.25 inches
by 0.25 inchcs
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Photo 26 : Ice Attached to Left Payload Bay Door
A portion of the supply water dump ice deposit on the forward section of the left payload bay
door was still attached after landing and measured approximately 8 inches by 4 inches by 2 inches
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Photo 27 : RH OMS Pod Tile Damage
Picccs of ice from the payload bay door falling aft during reentry are bclicvcd
to bc thc causc of thc tilc damage on thc right OMS pod
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Photo 28 : RH OMS Pod Tile Damage
Onc of thc largest tilc damagc sites on thc orbitcr was locatcd on thc RH OMS pod forward
facing surface and measurcd 8 inches by 5 inchcs by 2 inchcs. Thc damagc was most likcly caused
by impacts from supply watcr dump ice formcd while in orbit.
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Photo 29 : On-Orbil View of RH OMS Pod
On-orbit photograph takcn by the flight crcw two days prior to reentry vcrificd
no darnagc to RH OMS pod tilcs was prcscnt at that timc
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Photo 30 : Rudder/Speed Brake Tile Damage
Pieces of ice from thc payload bay door falling aft during reentry is believcd to bc
the cause ofthc tilc damage on the right rudder/speed brake panel
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pPhoto 31 : Rudder/Speed Brake Tile Damage
One of the largest tile damagc sites on thc orbitcr was located on the leading cdgc of thc right
rudder/speed brake panel and measured 12 inches by 4 inches by 2 inches. The damage was most
likely caused by impacts from supply water dump ice formed while in orbit.
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Photo 32 : LO2 ET/ORB Umbilical
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Photo 33 : LH2 ET/ORB Umbilical
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Photo 34 : First Flight of "Shuttered" Debris Retention System
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Photo 35 : Body Flap Stub Tile Damage
The aft quarter of a body flap stub tilc was missing from thc +Z side of the body flap below and
outboard of SSME #2. The black tilc fragment had shaken loose during SSME ignition and was
observed falling into the SSME exhaust hole during the launch film review.
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9.0 DEBRIS SAMPLE LAB REPORTS
A total of eight samples were obtained from OV-104 Atlantis during the STS-66 post landing
debris assessment at Dryden Flight Research Center, California. The submitted samples consisted
of 8 wipes from Orbiter windows #1-8. The samples were analyzed by the NASA KSC
Microchemical Analysis Branch (MAB) for material composition and comparison to known STS
materials. Debris analysis involves both the placing and the correlating of particles and residues
with respect to composition, thermal (mission) effects, and availability. Debris sample
results/analyses are listed by Orbiter location in the following summaries. Also included in this
report are the results of a recent Orbiter window debris sample from the STS-68 mission.
9.1 ORBITER WINDOWS
Samples from the Orbiter windows indicated exposure to facility environment, SRB BSM exhaust
(metallic particulate), landing site materials (earth minerals), Orbiter Thermal Protection System
(tile, tile repair, RTV and glass insulation), paints and primer from various sources. Paint
particulate continues to be present in a variety of colors: black, white, red, blue, green, and
yellow. The yellow paint particulate contained lead, which is typically found in facility/GSE paint.
There was no apparent vehicle damage related to these residuals.
9.2 STS-66 ORGANIC ANALYSIS
The results of the STS-66 organic analysis are shown in Figure 10. Identified materials include
those associated with window covers (plastic polymers), RTV from RCS thruster nozzle cover
adhesive and Orbiter Thermal Protection System, and paint from various sources. There was no
apparent vehicle damage related to these residuals.
9.3 STS-68 WINDOW DEBRIS SAMPLE
After Orbiter OV-105 (Endeavour) ferry flight to KSC/post-flight processing and during OPF
processing for the next mission, debris material was found between window #2, #3, and #4 frame
and glass pane. The recovered material appeared to have burned edges. This material was
examined/tested at the MAB and found to be a paper material containing an acrylic based paint
and having a polyester coating. The paper visually compared to the red and white checkered
'butcher paper' used on forward RCS nozzles to prevent moisture intrusion. Direct comparative
testing is in work. Motion picture cameras previously mounted in the pilot's window on some of
the launches early in the program had documented FRCS paper cover impacts on the forward
facing windows during ascent. No apparent vehicle debris damage was caused by this debris.
9.4 NEW FINDINGS
This set of post-flight debris residual samples led to one new finding, which was obtained in the
STS-68 window debris sample. The material was identified as 'butcher paper' used for moisture
protection on the Reaction Control System thruster nozzles. This debris sample showed the
Orbiter windows continue to be an area that collects various forms of debris and is consequently a
constant source of post flight samples. The recovered paper material did not appear to be related
to any debris damage.
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Figure 10 : Orbiter Post Landing Microchemical Sample Results
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10.0 POST LAUNCH ANOMALIES
Based on the debris walkdowns and film/video review, twelve post launch anomalies, including
three In-Flight Anomalies (IFA's), were observed on the STS-66 mission.
10.1 LAUNCH PAD/SHUTTLE LANDING FACILITY
1. Numerous open and damaged access doors and cable tray covers.
2. A 4-foot by 5-foot Herculite cover lay on the FSS 195 foot level grating.
10.2 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS
1. The RI-I frustum was missing no TPS but had 50 debonds over fasteners and 2 debonds over
acreage. Since the number of debonds was greater than the frustum history average of 25
debonds, a representative set of the MSA-2 debonds were analyzed by MSFC for possible
material or processing anomalies (IFA: MSA-2 did not adhere to painted surfaces adjacent to PR
1422-sealant-over-fastener debonds. The problem was traced to an MSA-2 spray pump problem).
2. A 2-inch debond occurred at the 145 degree location in the RH forward segment factory joint.
3. One MSA-2 debond occurred near the Right aft skirt -Y axis at the XB-1860 ring frame. A
2-inch diameter MSA-2 divot was present near the -Y axis at the XB-1894 ring frame.
4. The LH frustum was missing no TPS but had 39 MSA-2 debonds over fasteners.
10.3 EXTERNAL TANK
1. Two TPS divots were observed on the LO2 tank at or near the LO2 pressurization line ramps:
one 4-inch divot at approximately XT-514; one 9-inch divot at approximately XT-676.
2. Three stringer head divots were observed on the intertank acreage: one 14-inch divot just
forward of the -Y bipod spindle housing closeout; one 17-inch divot with exposed substrate on
the +Z axis forward of the bipods; and one 24-inch divot with exposed substrate on the +Z axis
forward of the bipods. (This type of divot had been the subject of an IFA previously.
Manufacturing procedures at the factory were modified, effective on ET-74, to reduce the
potential for TPS damage during intertank assembly).
3. The lightning contact strip across the forward part of the LO2 ET/ORB umbilical was missing
and observed drifting near the umbilical area.
10.4 ORBITER
1. A 2-inch by 1-inch by 1-inch portion of an aft perimeter tile on window #8 was missing.
(IFA STS-66-V-15).
2. The supply water dump ice deposit on the forward section of the left payload bay door, as
observed in the on-orbit video downlink, was still attached after landing and measured
approximately 8 inches by 4 inches by 2 inches. (IFA STS-66-V-10/IPR 71V-0013: Ice on Supply
Water Dump). Shedding ice from this area during reentry most likely caused the tile damage on
the right OMS pod and rudder/speed brake.
3. The largest tile damage sites on the orbiter were located on the top of the RH OMS pod
forward facing surface measuring 8 inches by 5 inches by 2 inches and on the leading edge of the
right rudder/speed brake panel measuring 12 inches by 4 inches by 2 inches. The damage was
most likely caused by impacts from supply water dump ice formed while in orbit.
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1. OV-104 STS-66 FILM/VIDEO SCREENING AND TIMING
. OV-104 STS-66 FILM/VIDEO SCREENING AND TIMING
SUMMARY
1.1 SCREENING ACTIVITIES
1.1.1 Launch
Atlantis (OV-104) launched on mission STS-66 from Pad B at 16:59:43.015 Coordinated
Universal Time (UTC) on November 3, 1994 (day 307) as seen on camera E-9. Solid
rocket booster (SRB) separation occurred at 17:01:47.697 UTC as seen on camera ET-
207.
On launch day, 23 videos were screened. Following launch day, 53 films were reviewed.
No anomalies were observed during launch.
DTO-312 photography of the STS-66 external tank (after separation) was acquired using
a 35 mm Nikon camera equipped with a 300 mm lens and a 2X extender (Method 3).
Twenty-two exposures from Magazine 01 were received and screened. In addition, the
crew obtained video footage of the ET after separation. Results from this screening
process can be found in Section 2.4.1.
1.1.2 On-Orbit
No on-orbit events required PTAP support.
1.1.3 Landing
The first landing opportunity on the morning of November 14 was waived off due to
weather constraints at the Kennedy Space Center.
Atlantis landed on runway 22 at Edwards Air Force Base on November 14, 1994 (day
318). Six videos of the Orbiter's approach and landing were received. NASA Select, a
composite created from the available landing views, was also screened.
Event Description
Landing gear doors opened
Timing
15:33:22.310 UTC
Wheel stop
Camera
LRO- 1
Left main gear touchdown 15:33:45.031 UTC LRO- 1
Right main gear touchdown 15:33:45.064 UTC LRO-1
Nose wheel touchdown 15:33:55.608 UTC LRO- 1
15:33:35.348 UTC LRO- 1
Landing Event TimesTable 1.1.3
Two dark pieces of debris, thought to be related to the drag chute apparatus, were noted
during the rollout. Two dark pieces of debris were seen near the drag chute during
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deployment. See Section 2.6.2 for event details. Consultation with engineers suggested
that Teflon coverings (recently added to reduce abrasion) as the most likely source of the
debris. Landing films will be reviewed for more detail when they are received.
A white protuberance was seen on the cargo bay door just aft of the overhead window on
the port side during the walkaround. TPS engineers have confirmed that this object was
ice.
The deployment of the drag chute appeared as expected. See Figure 2.6.3 for event
times.
The following items were noted during the post landing walk around: TPS damage to the
starboard side of the rudder speed brake, slight TPS damage to the right OMS pod, slight
tile damage on the underside of the right wing, and slight TPS damage on the base heat
shield between the SSMEs. The drag chute housing and the tires appeared to be in
satisfactory condition.
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All videos except ET-208 and KTV-7B had timing and film cameras E-1, E-2, E-3, E-4,
E-5, E-6, E-7, E-8, E-9, E-10, E-11, E-12, E-14, E-15, E-17, E-18, E-19, E-20, E-25, E-
26, E-52, E-54, E-57, E-59, E-79, E-222 and E-224 had in-frame alphanumeric timing.
These videos and films were used to time specific mission events during the initial
screening. The following events were timed from film cameras:
Frame Comments
Large light colored debris near RSRB aft
skirt
Camera
E-213
E-207
E-220
Same debris causes flare in SSME plume
Debris fell along SRB plume
Debris fell along SRB plume
Debris fell along SRB plume
Debris fell along SRB plume
Debris fell along SRB plume
Debris fell along SRB plume
Debris fell along SRB plume
Recirculation start
Recirculation stop
SRB Separation
Table 1.2 Film Camera Timing Events
Timing Cu'TC)
307:17:00:14.123
307:17:00:14.238
307:17:00:49.965
307:17:00:53.218
307:17:00:53.248
307:17:00:53.743
307:17:00:55.512
307:17:00:58.909
307:17:01:04.412
307:17:01:18.254
307:17:01:25.515
307:17:01:47.674
III IIII
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.
2.1
SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS ANALYSIS
DEBRIS
2.1.1 Debris near the Time of SSME Ignition
2.1.1.1 LH2 and LO2 Tail Service Mast (TSM) T- 0 Umbilical Disconnect
Debris
(Cameras E-17, E-18, E-19, E-20, E-76, E-77, 0TV-149, OTV-150, 0TV-
170, 0TV-171)
Normal ice debris was noted falling from the LH2 and LO2 TSM T-0 umbilical
disconnect areas at SSME ignition through liftoff. None of the debris was observed to
strike the vehicle. No follow-up action was requested.
2.1.1.2 LH2 and LO2 ET/Orbiter Umbilical Disconnect Debris
(Cameras E-4, E-5, E-6, E-16, E-25, E-26, E-30, E-31, E-34, E-35, E-40,
E-52, E-54, E-57, E-65, E-79, OTV-109, 0TV-154, 0TV-163)
Normal ice debris was noted falling from the LH2 and LO2 ET/Orbiter umbilical
disconnect areas at SSME ignition through lift.ft. Multiple pieces of light colored debris
(probably ice) were seen striking the umbilical sill and the electric cable tray during
SSME startup (as seen on OTV-109). No damage to the SLV was apparent in either case.
2.1.1.3 Rectangular Debris Between Body Flap and SSME #2
(Cameras E-5, E-18)
A rectangular-shaped piece of debris, possibly a tile fragment, was seen near the body
flap at T-2.782 seconds. The debris, light on one side and dark on the other, was first
seen tumbling between the body flap and SSME #2. (See Figure 2.1.1.3). The origin of
the debris could not be determined.
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Figure 2.1.1.3 Rectangular Debris Near Body Flap
A rectangular piece of debris is seen passing in front of SSME #2 just prior to liftoff on
camera E-18. The debris did not appear to strike the vehicle. No specific source for the
debris was identified.
2.1.2 Debris near the Time of SRB Ignition
2.1.2.1 Holddown Post Debris
(Camera E-I I)
A small piece of dark debris fell from the LSRB HDP M-7 shoe area into the SRB flame
duct at liftoff.
2.1.2.2 Dark Debris Falls Along Vehicle at Liftoff
(Camera E-30)
Several pieces of dark colored debris were seen falling with the FSS deluge water along
the left side of the vehicle during liftoff. This debris did not appear to strike the vehicle.
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2.1.2.3 SRB Flame Duct Debris
(Cameras E-5, E-7, E-8, E-9, E-11, E-12, E-14, E-15, E-16, E-25, 0TV-
163)
As on previous missions, several pieces of debris were noted originating from the SRB
flame duct area after SRB ignition. Two large pieces of debris (possibly closeout tags)
were noted from the flame duct at liftoff (as seen on camera E-5). Three pieces of dark
colored debris were seen coming out of the LSRB flame duct (as seen on camera E- 11).
Three pieces of dark debris, first seen near the aft skirt of the RSRB, traveled up and then
fell into the SSME exhaust trench at liftoff. No damage to the SLV was observed from
these events.
2.1.3 Debris after Liftoff
(Cameras E-40, E-52, E-54, E-57, E-63, E-207, E-208, E-212, E-213, E-
220, E-222, ET-207, OTV-161, OTV-170)
Multiple pieces of debris were seen falling aft of the Shuttle Launch Vehicle (SLV)
between tower clear and early ascent on the launch tracking views. Most of the debris
sightings were probably reaction control system (RCS) paper or ice from the ET/Orbiter
umbilicals. None of the debris was observed to strike the vehicle.
2.1.3.1 Debris Causes Flare in SSME Plume at 31 Seconds MET
(Cameras E-213, E-222)
A large light colored piece of debris, first noted near the RSRB aft skirt, fell aft and
flared in the SSME exhaust plume at 31.223 seconds MET.
2.1.3.2 Debris Seen Between 66 and 81 Seconds MET
(Cameras E-220, E-223)
At least seven pieces of light colored debris fell along the SRB exhaust plume between
66 and 81 seconds MET. (See Section 1.2 for UTC times).
2.1.3.3 Debris Reported by the Crew (Task #10)
CAPCOM
Atlantis, we are ready to copy a debris report when you have a moment.
ATLANTIS
Houston, on the debris report, all we are seeing is the standard ice particles that we
usually see. We got just a little bit of smudging on the front windows as normal. We
see nothing that is abnormal whatsoever, Joey.
CAPCOM
OK, copy that John. Thanks.
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2.2 MLP EVENTS
2.2.1 Orange Vapor (Possibly Free-burning Hydrogen)
(Cameras E-19, E-20, 0TV-171)
Orange vapor (probably free burning hydrogen) was seen above the SSME #1 rim at T-
5.102 seconds. This event has been noted on past missions and would become a concern
if the vapor is seen as high as the umbilical areas. On this mission, however, the vapor
was below the umbilicals and no follow up action was requested.
2.2.2 Base Heat Shield Erosion
(Cameras E-19, E-20)
A small area of TPS erosion was noted on the base of the right RCS stinger during SSME
ignition on camera E-19. Additional erosion was visible at the base of the left OMS
nozzle on camera E-20. No follow up action was requested.
2.2.3 Vapor Along Right Inboard Elevon
(Camera E-6)
A vapor-like substance was seen along the right inboard elevon after SSME ignition and
through liftoff (2.9 seconds MET). No follow up action was requested.
2.3 ASCENT EVENTS
2.3.1 Body Flap Motion (Task #4)
(Camera E-207)
Slight body flap motion was seen as the vehicle passed through the time of maximum
dynamic pressure on this mission. This event has been tracked on all missions since
reflight. However, motion was not deemed sufficient to warrant more detailed analysis.
2.3.2 Linear Optical Effect
(Cameras E-207, E-208, E-212, E-223, ET-207, ET-208, ET-212, KTV-13)
Multiple linear optical effects were seen between 70 and 80 seconds MET. Engineers at
JSC have previously attributed this event seen on earlier missions to the manifestation of
shock waves around the SLV. No follow-up action was requested.
2.3.3 Recirculation
(Cameras E-205, E-207)
The recirculation or expansion of burning gases at the aft end of the SLV prior to SRB
separation has been seen on nearly all previous missions. Recirculation on this mission
was observed between approximately 96 and 103 seconds MET on camera E-207.
2.4 Onboard Photography of the ET (DTO-312)
2.4.1 Analysis of Handheld Photography of the ET (Task #6)
DTO-312 photography of the STS-66 external tank (after separation) was acquired using
a Nikon camera with a 300 mm lens and a 2X extender (Method 3). Twenty-two
exposures from Magazine 01 were received. Lighting conditions at the time of the
external tank photography acquisition was not good. The external tank was back lit by
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the sun. After the twelfth frame, the external tank was crossing the earth's terminator and
the images became very dark. The first picture was taken at 17:15:38 UTC
(approximately sixteen minutes after liftoff) and the last picture was taken at 17:20:29
UTC. The focus is good on all frames. Timing data is present on the film.
In addition to DTO-312 photography, the astronauts were able to capture some video
footage of the ET. Multiple pieces of white debris (probably frozen hydrogen) and
vapors were visible spewing from the aft end of the external tank. The debris and vapors
appeared to originate from the ET/Orbiter umbilicals. In one segment of the video the
debris and vapors were seen coming from the LH2 umbilical (area). Venting from the
umbilicals after separation was previously seen on STS-45, STS-53, and STS-68.
2.4.2 Umbilical Well Camera Analysis (Task #5)
Three rolls of STS-66 umbilical well camera film were received at JSC: the 35 mm film
from the LO2 umbilical and two 16 mm films (5 mm lens and 10 mm lens) from the LH2
umbilical. The +X translation maneuver was performed on STS-66. During this DTO,
the ET was back lit by the sun which degraded some of the views. As a consequence, the
35 and 16 mm films had good to dark exposure. The focus was good. No timing was
available on these films.
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2.4.2.1 35 mm Umbilical Film Screening
Figure 2.4.2.1 Linear Marks on Intertank Stringer (STS066-210-058)
Sixty-one exposures of the ET were taken with the 35 mm umbilical well camera. The
ET appeared in good condition but white marks (divots) and other TPS surface changes
were noted. (See Figure 2.4.2.1). There was a linear shaped white divot observed on an
intertank stringer forward of the ET/Orbiter forward attach bipod foot (1). A similar
marks in the same position was seen on STS-62. Two additional linear shaped white
marks (divots) were located on the intertank stringers forward of the forward ET/Orbiter
attach near the center of the intertank. These divots measured 24 and 15 inches in length
(2 and 3). Dark areas in the center of these two light colored marks indicate exposed
substrate. A simiIar mark on an intertank stringer head was seen on the STS-58 35 mm
umbilical well film. Other divots observed on the ET included:
• Two white marks (divots) on the LH2 tank/intertank closeout flange in the +Y
direction from the LO2 feedline (4).
• White mark (divot) on the LH2 tank/intertank closeout flange near the left foot of the
forward ET/Orbiter attach bipod (5).
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• White circular shaped mark (divot) on the nose of the ET (ogive) near the LO2
pressurization line (6).
Minor TPS erosion and voids were visible on the aft LO2 feed line bellows and support
bracket. The small white erosion or "pop corn" marks visible on the intertank in the
vicinity of the forward ET/Orbiter attach bipod were less than that seen on most previous
missions. Multiple TPS erosion marks and voids were visible on the LH2 tank TPS in
the -Y direction from the aft LO2 feed line support bracket just forward of the cross
beam.
The lightning contact strip at the 12' o clock position forward of the LO2 17 inch line
orifice was the only structural component noted missing on the STS-66 umbilical well
films. LO2 umbilical lightning contact strip(s) were also missing on STS-57, STS-58,
STS-65 and other previous mission umbilical well films. The presence of the red seal
around the EO-3 fitting was confirmed.
Small white debris were noted near the ET throughout the sequence of film exposures.
Many of these objects appeared to be frozen hydrogen. A small bright piece of debris
seen on frame 35 could not be identified.
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2.4.2.2 16 mm Umbilical Film Screening (5 mm & 10 mm Lens)
yi
Figure 2.4.2.2 Frozen Hydrogen at LH2 Umbilical (5mm Lens, Frame 398)
A dark, flat, rectangular shaped piece of debris was visible coming from behind the
electric cable tray (on frame 398) prior to SRB separation. (See Figure 2.4.2.2). This
debris may be a chip of TPS material. Similar debris from behind the electric cable tray
were also visible before and after SRB separation (frames 576 and 1123 on the 5 mm lens
view, frame 1197 on the 10 mm lens view). Dark debris coming from behind the electric
cable tray had been seen on previous mission umbilical well camera views.
Numerous light colored pieces of debris (probably insulation) were in view throughout
the SRB film sequence. Typical chipping and erosion of the electric cable tray were
visible. Erosion and charring on the base of this vertical strut and of the ETFLSRB aft
attach brace were visible. A blistering of the fire barrier coating on the outboard side of
the LH2 umbilical was apparent. Multiple pieces of white debris (frozen hydrogen) were
visible throughout the ET separation sequence. These events were typical of those seen
on previous mission umbilical well camera views.
A concentrated area of white vapors was visible on the +Y side of the LSRB below the
ET/LSRB aft attach (5 mm lens view, frame 735) prior to SRB separation. Similar white
vapors were visible on previous mission umbilical well camera views. The vapors
appeared more evident than usual on the STS-66 views (possibly due to back lighting
from the sun).
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A reflective linear shaped piece of debris was visible near the LO2 umbilical (10 mm
view, frame 7272). This piece of debris may have been the missing lightning contact
strip noted on the 35 mm umbilical film.
Frozen hydrogen was visible in the orifice of the LH2 umbilical 17 inch line connect after
ET separation. Frozen hydrogen was visible aft of the cross beam forward and to the
right of the LH2 umbilical (10 mm lens view, frame 6049). The red seal near the EO-2
fitting appears in place.
2.5 ON-ORBIT EVENTS
There were no on-orbit events which required PTAP support. However, in response to
post-flight requests from the MER and TPS engineers, analysts reviewed on-orbit videos
and photography to determine whether the damage seen to the right OMS pod during the
post landing walkaround was visible prior to re-entry.
2.5.1 Analysis of On-Orbit Right OMS Pod Damage (Task #16)
The icicle attached to the payload bay door may have broken loose during re-entry and
caused damage to the right OMS pod and damaged the right side of the rudder. Videos
and films acquired on-orbit were screened to verify that the damage was not present prior
to re-entry.
All on-board Hasselblad and Linhoff films were reviewed. The best view of the right
OMS pod was on Linhoff film STS66_LINHF._155160 acquired 26 hours prior to
landing (94-11-13 13:35:33 UTC). No damage to the fight OMS pod is visible on this
view. The film quality and resolution was such, that if the damage was present it should
have been visible. The rudder was imaged many times on the on-board films but the
view angle from the crew cabin was not sufficient to see the right side of the rudder
where the damage occurred. No definitive conclusion could be drawn about the presence
or absence of rudder damage on-orbit.
Both the downlink and on-board on-orbit videos were selectively screened. None
of the video views of the right OMS pod showed indications of damage. Views of
the right side of the rudder were limited and provided no information on possible
damage.
2.6 LANDING EVENTS
2.6.1 Landing Sink Rate Analysis (Task #3)
The sink rate of the Orbiter was determined over a one-second interval prior to main gear
and nose gear touchdown. The calculation method described in section 2.6.1.1 was used
for all nose and main gear sink rate determinations.
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2.6.1.1 Landing Sink Rate Analysis Using Film
(Cameras E-1036, E-1002)
STS-66 main gear sink rate
(camera E-1036)
1.8
1 4 1.21 fl/sec
'-" 1 v _ 1.27 ft/see
- -0.6 -0.3
-02 I
Time relative tO t0uchdown(s_/zbfidS)
Figure 2.6.1.1(a) Main Gear Sink Rate from Film
---......-..measured height '.
I_ I
"trend - 1.5 see i
" -' trend - i .0 see
1,,--- -trend -0.5 sec :
"trend-0.25 see I
Camera E-1036 was used to determine the landing sink rate of the main gear. The
analysis considered approximately one second of imagery immediately prior to
touchdown. Data was gathered at a sample rate of 24 frames per second. The diameter of
the main gear was used as the scaling factor. The main gear height above the ground for
each frame was calculated by multiplying the digitized height and the scaling factor.
These heights were then regressed with respect to time. Sink rate equals the slope of this
regression line. The main gear sink rate was determined to be 1.2 feet per second. The
graph of the main gear height versus time is shown on Figure 2.6.1.1 (a).
N
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STS-66 nose gear sink rate
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Figure 2.6.1.1(b) Nose Gear Sink Rate from Film
red height!
"trend-l.71 sec l
"trend - 1.0 sec ]
•"trend-0.5 sec ]
"trend -0.25 sec i
Camera E-1002 was used to determine the landing sink rate of the nose gear. The
analysis considered approximately one second of imagery immediately prior to
touchdown. Data was gathered at a sample rate of 24 frames per second. The diameter of
the nose gear was used as the scaling factor. The nose gear height above the ground for
each frame was calculated by multiplying the digitized height and the scaling factor.
These heights were then regressed with respect to time. Sink rate equals the slope of this
regression line. The nose gear sink rate was determined to be 5.4 feet per second. The
graph of the nose gear height versus time is shown on Figure 2.6.1. l(b).
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2.6.1.2 Landing Sink Rate Analysis Using Video
(Cameras TV-1, TV-3) .....
STS-66 main gear sink rate
(camera TV-3)
1.56 ft/sec
Time relative to touchdown (seconds)
Figure 2.6.1.2(a) Main Gear Sink Rate from Video
Camera TV-3 was used to determine the landing sink rate of the main gear. The analysis
considered approximately two second of imagery immediately prior to touchdown. Data
was gathered at a sample rate of 30 frames per second. The diameter of the main gear was
used as the scaling factor. The main gear height above the ground for each frame was
calculated by multiplying the digitized height and the scaling factor. These heights were
then regressed with respect to time. Sink rate equals the slope of this regression line.
The main gear sink rate was determined to be 1.6 feet per second. The graph of the main
gear height versus time is shown on Figure 2.6.1.2(a).
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Camera TV-1 was used to determine the landing sink rate of the nose gear. The analysis
considered approximately two second of imagery immediately prior to touchdown. Data
was gathered at a sample rate of 30 frames per second. The diameter of the nose gear was
used as the scaling factor. The nose gear height above the ground for each frame was
calculated by multiplying the digitized height and the scaling factor. These heights were
then regressed with respect to time. Sink rate equals the slope of this regression line.
The nose gear sink rate was determined to be 5.1 feet per second. The graph of the nose
gear height versus time is shown on Figure 2.6.1.2(b).
2.6.2 Dark Debris Seen During Drag Chute Deployment
(Cameras TV-1, TV-3)
Two dark objects fell aft of the vehicle and are thought to be related to the drag chute
deployment. The first dark object was first seen near the drag chute at bag release
(15:33:50.803 UTC). The second object was first noted at the top edge of the drag chute
and fell aft during rollout (15:34:00.646 UTC). Consultation with drag chute personnel
indicates that these objects are Teflon cloth material used in packing to prevent abrasion.
No further analysis of this event is expected.
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Figure 2.6.2 Dark Debris Near Drag Chute
A small piece of dark debris can be seen near the 10 o'clock position of the disreefed
drag chute during rollout. The debris (shown here on a camera TV-3 view) did not
appear to come in contact with the vehicle.
2.6.3 Drag Chute Performance (Task #9)
The landing of Atlantis at the end of mission STS-66 marked the nineteenth deployment
of the Orbiter drag chute. The deployment of the drag chute appeared as expected. Event
times were obtained from cameras DTV- 1 and DTV-3:
Event Description
Drag chute initiation
Pilot chute at full inflation
Bag release
Drag chute inflation in reefed
configuration
Drag chute inflation in disreefed
configuration
Chute release
Timing
15:33:49.122 UTC
15:33:49.936 UTC
15:33:50.670 UTC
15:33:51.704 UTC
15:33:55.008 UTC
15:34: 16. 195 UTC
Camera
DTV-3
DTV- 1
DTV- 1
DTV- 1
DTV- 1
DTV- 1
Table 2.6.3 Drag Chute Event Times
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STS-66 Drag Chute Heading Angle versus Time
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Figure 2.6.3(a) Heading Angle Versus Time
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STS-66 Drag Chute Riser Angle versus Time
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Standard analysis of the drag chute angles as a function of time was performed using the
views from the video camera labeled "Runway Camera" then verified with the film
cameras E-1030 and E-1031. This analysis is used to support the improvement of the
aerodynamic math models currently in use. Figure 2.6.3(a) presents the measured
heading angle versus time. Figure 2.6.3(b) presents the measured riser angle versus time.
The maximum measured horizontal chute deflection (heading angle) was approximately
7.4 degrees to the port side of the vehicle. The vertical chute deflection (riser angle)
ranged from -6.2 to +4.2 degrees relative to the Orbiter coordinate system.
2.6.4 Orbiter Height above Threshold (Task #13)
The height of the Orbiter above the threshold at landing for the STS-68 mission was not
completed at the time of this report. The analysis request specifies that a camera with a
perpendicular view of the runway at the threshold location be used for the analysis. This
view is currently only available for landings at KSC. This analysis task will be
completed using alternative developmental methods as time is available.
2.7 OTHER NORMAL EVENTS
Other normal events observed include: normal SSME ignition sequence, body flap
vibration after SSME ignition, ET twang prior to liftoff, frost on the ET vent louvers
prior to liftoff, right and left inboard and outboard elevon vibration after SSME ignition
and at liftoff, RCS paper debris after SSME ignition, multiple pieces of white debris
(probably ice from the ET/Orbiter umbilicals) fell along the body flap after liftoff, ice
and vapor from the GUCP area during ET GH2 umbilical vent arm retraction, vapors
from the ET gaseous hydrogen umbilical disconnect during early liftoff, multiple pieces
of dark debris in the exhaust cloud after liftoff, acoustic waves in the SRB exhaust plume
after liftoff, multiple pieces of light colored debris noted aft of the SLV during early
ascent, vapor from both SRB stiffener rings after liftoff, ET aft dome outgassing, charring
of the ET aft dome, flares in the SSME exhaust plume after the roll maneuver,
condensation around SLV after the roll maneuver, SRB plume brightening prior to SRB
separation, SRB separation, and slag in the SRB exhaust plume after SRB separation.
Normal pad events observed were hydrogen ignitor operation, fixed service structure
(FSS) deluge water spray activation, sound suppression water initiation, multiple pieces
of light colored debris falling from the FSS during SSME ignition, latch back of the GH2
vent arm, and MLP deluge water operation.
2.8 OTHER
2.8.1 Terminal Events Timing Interval (Task #11)
A detailed timeline of the SSME and SRB ignition sequences was generated and sent to
R. Fletcher/JSC-VF5.
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I • INTRODUCTION
The launch of space shuttle mission STS-66, the thirteenth
flight of the Orbiter Atlantis occurred on November 3, 1994, at
approximately 10:59 A.M. Central Standard Time from Launch
Complex 39B (LC-39B), Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida.
Extensive photographic and video coverage exists and has been
evaluated to determine proper operation of the ground and flight
hardware. Cameras (video and cine) providing this coverage are
located on the fixed service structure (FSS), mobile launch
platform (MLP), LC-39B perimeter sites, onboard the vehicle, and
uprange and downrange tracking sites.
II. ENGINEERING ANALYSIS OBJECTIVES:
The planned engineering photographic and video analysis
objectives for STS-66 included, but were not limited to the
following:
a. Overall facility and shuttle vehicle coverage for
anomaly detection
b. Verification of cameras, lighting and timing systems
c. Determination of SRB PIC firing time and SRB
separation time
d. Verification of Thermal Protection System (TPS)
integrity
e. Correct operation of the following:
,
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
i0.
Holddown post blast covers
SSME ignition
LH2 and L02 17" disconnects
GH2 umbilical
TSM carrier plate umbilicals
Free hydrogen ignitors
Vehicle clearances
GH2 vent line retraction and latch back
Vehicle motion
External Tank TPS condition after separation
(DTO-0312)
III. CAMERA COVERAGE ASSESSMENT:
Film was received from fifty-three of fifty-four requested
cameras as well as video from twenty-four of twenty-four
requested cameras. The following table illustrates the camera
data received at MSFC for STS-66.
B-4
Canna data r_ at MSI_
for STS_
lVILP
Perime_r
 rack 
Oi_ani
16ram 85ram Video
21 0 4
7 0 3
3 3 6
0 15 10
2 2 1
Totals 33 20 24
Total ntm_r of films and videos received: 77
a. Ground Camera Coverage:
Both film and video from ground cameras were of excellent
quality. The mid-day launch time and clear skies provided good
lighting conditions. However, the cameras on the MLP deck that
view up (E-17, E-18, E-25, and E-26) experienced strong back-
lighting from the sun. Camera E-13 which views the left SRB
holddown post M-6 did not run. Timing was not recorded on
camera E-16 due to a faulty timing cable.
b. Onboard Camera Coverage:
Twenty-two exposures of the ET after separation were
recorded by the astronauts using the hand-held 35mm camera. The
tank was back lighted by the sun and only the -Y axis, nose and
-Z axis were visible. A video of the ET after separation was
also recorded. The umbilical well cameras operated properly on
this mission and provided good coverage of the SRB and ET
separation events.
IV. ANOMALIES/OBSERVATIONS:
No anomalies were observed during the launch of
STS-66.
a. General Observations:
B-5
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While viewing the film, several events were noted which
occur on most missions. These included: pad debris rising and
falling as the vehicle lifts off, debris induced streaks in the
SSME plume, ice falling from the 17 inch disconnects and
umbilicals, and debris particles falling aft of the vehicle
during ascent, which consist of RCS motor covers, hydrogen fire
detection paper and purge barrier material, loose SRB thermal
curtain tape, glowing debris particles exiting the SRM plumes
and slag from the SRM's prior to and during SRB separation.
Three streaks of similar appearance and position were
observed from the ME-1 nozzle prior to liftoff. These streaks
occurred at 16:59:41.877, 16:59:41.885, and 16:59:41.912 UTC as
recorded by camera E-3. Figure 1 depicts the third occurrence
of this event.
Figure 1 Streak in ME-1 at 16:59:41.912 UTC
A piece of orbiter TPS tile was observed falling between
the body flap and the ME-2 nozzle during SSME ignition at
16:59:40.2 UTC. The origin of the tile could not be determined.
The tile appears to be approximately 1 x 2 x 6 inches in size
and to be a broken piece. Figure 2 is a film frame from camera
E-18 showing this tile piece.
A debris particle was observed between the SRB's, aft of
the ET aft dome, and became entrained in the SSME plume creating
B-6
r_
a large flare in the plumes at T+25.07 seconds. This event was
recorded by camera E-213 and is shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4.
Figure 2 Broken tile piece falling from vehicle
Figure 3 Debris particle between SRB's
l
J
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/Figure 4 Debris particle in SSME plume
A rope like debris particle was observed falling from near
the left SRB nozzle exit plane at T+66.72 seconds. Figure 5 is
a film frame from camera E-212 showing this event. Previous
debris of this type has been attributed to either SRM plume
particles or thermal curtain tape.
Figure 5 Debris particle falling from near left SRB nozzle
8-8

b. ET TPS assessment:
Several divots were noted on the ET from the umbilical
well cameras after separation. Popcorning of the lower third of
the LH2 tank TPS acreage was noted as shown in Figure 6.
7
Figure 6 Popcorning of LH2 tank TPS acreage
Two large divots were noted on the intertank aligned with the
stringers along the +Z axis. These divots appear to be 4 x 36
and 4 x 24 inches in size, respectively. Several divots were
noted on or near the intertank/LH2 tank scarf joint. A divot
was located on the leading edge of the left bipod ramp. A divot
was located on the GOX pressurant line ramp midway along the
ogive. These divots are shown in Figure 7 which was taken from
the 35mm camera located in the orbiter L02 umbilical well.
B-9

Figure 7 ET TPS divots
c. ET venting:
Venting of gases and solid particles after separation was
observed on the handheld camcorder video recorded by the
astronauts. The venting was occurring from both the LH2 and LO2
17 inch disconnects. No timing information is available.
However, approximately 2 minutes of the venting was recorded and
was continuing at the end of this tape. This venting is shown
as Figure 8.
Figure 8 ET venting
B-IO
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V. ENGINEERING DATA RESULTS:
a. T-Zero Times:
T-Zero times are determined from cameras that view the SRB
holddown posts numbers M-l, M-2, M-5 and M-6. These cameras
record the explosive bolt combustion products.
HOLDDOWN POST CAMERA POSITION TIME (UTC)
M-I E-9 16:59:43.012
M-2 E-8 16:59:43.014
M-5 E-12 16:59:43.012
M-6 E-13 No run
b. ET Tip Deflection:
Maximum ET tip deflection for this mission was determined
to be approximately 31 inches. Figure 9 is a data plot showing
the measured motion of the ET tip in both the horizontal and
vertical directions. A positive horizontal displacement
represents motion in the -Z direction. These data were derived
from film camera E-79.
X:
40.01
30.0
20.0
10.0
0.0
-10.0
-6.0
El- Tip Deflection
STS-66 Camera E-79
- , I . ' I ' T -_
Horizon(al Displacement |
-4.0 -2.0 0.0 2.0
Seconds Relative to T-O
Figure 9 ET Tip Deflection
c. SRB Separation Time:
SRB separation time for STS-66 was determined to be
307:17:01:47.72 UTC (124.72 seconds MET) as recorded by camera
E-208.
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